Engineering students get lesson in leadership

By Patrick Kurp
Special to Rice News

"There is no such thing as safety at all costs," said Nancy Currie, former NASA astronaut and the principal engineer for the space agency’s Engineering and Safety Center at the Johnson Space Center. Currie discussed her role investigating the space shuttle Columbia disaster with a class of engineering students.

David Niño gave the students in his Engineering 315 class, Leading Teams and Innovation, an exercise that seemed safely academic, like a story problem in a high-school math book.

A team of drivers and mechanics is preparing for a race. Data collected from previous races suggests a causal relationship may exist between ambient air temperature and head-gasket failure. Money, commercial sponsorships and driver/spectator safety ride on the team’s decision to race or not to race. What should they do?

Fifty-six percent of Niño’s 25 students voted in favor of proceeding with the race despite the risks. “It’s true that nobody ever won a race sitting in the pit, but in this case there was something else going on. The results could have been devastating,” said Niño, professor in the practice of engineering leadership and lecturer in management at the Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business.

In a sense, Niño had given his engineering students a trick question, or at least a disguised question. The conditions he outlined mirrored those present during the doomed flight of the space shuttle Challenger, which exploded shortly after takeoff Jan. 28, 1986, killing all seven astronauts aboard.

“There is no such thing as safety at all costs,” said Nancy J. Currie, former NASA astronaut and the principal engineer for the space agency’s Engineering and Safety Center at the Johnson Space Center. “There’s always risk involved in human spaceflight. In any project, there are a multitude of technical, cost, schedule and safety considerations. The challenge is to find the appropriate balance point of these factors and engineers must assist managers by providing the data to help make informed decisions.”

Currie met with the students in Niño’s class, outlined her experience flying on four shuttle missions, logging more than 1,000 hours in space, and discussed her role before and after the space shuttle Columbia disaster Feb. 1, 2003, in which another seven astronauts died.

During entry, Columbia experienced structural failure of the left wing, resulting in breakup of the vehicle. At the time of disintegration the orbiter was traveling in excess of Mach 18 at approximately 208,000 feet. This combination of speed and altitude resulted in a huge debris field that stretched from Dallas to western Louisiana. More than 16,000 people spent months searching to recover the remnants of Columbia. As a result of their tireless efforts, almost 40 percent of the vehicle was recovered. The debris was returned to a hangar at the Kennedy Space Center, analyzed and laid out on a grid that corresponded to the outline of the orbiter. The recovered debris was extremely important in determining the cause of the Columbia accident.

Currie was personally involved in the recovery efforts. “It’s one of the most difficult things I’ve ever done in my life,” she said, “but it was amazing how much we found and what we were able to return to assist in the accident investigation.”

Investigators determined the disaster was caused by a 1.67-pound piece of insulating foam that separated from the external fuel tank and struck the craft’s left wing. The impact resulted in a large hole that permitted superheated gases to damage the wing structure. In their report issued six months after the  accident, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board identified three distinct categories of causal factors that contributed to the loss of Columbia and the crew – physical failures, cultural issues and organizational issues. In addressing NASA’s safety culture, the CAIB concluded, “… the accident was probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather likely rooted to some degree in NASA’s history and the human space flight program’s culture.”

Currie encouraged all young engineers to express their doubts about any project – and to gather the data to support their position. “Some engineers are very good technically, but they’re introverted. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded the accident was due, in part, to ‘failure of foresight.’ Don’t be afraid to raise technical issues. If you don’t feel comfortable voicing your concerns, identify colleagues or leaders who you trust to discuss your issue and viewpoint,” she said.

Currie served in the United States Army for 23 years and retired with the rank of colonel in 2005. She joined the NASA Johnson Space Center in 1987 as a flight simulation engineer and was selected as an astronaut in 1990. In 1997 she earned a Ph.D. in industrial engineering from the University of Houston. In the third of her four shuttle flights, Currie took part in first International Space Station assembly mission, in December 1998.

“A ship in a harbor is safe, but that’s not what ships are built for,” she said. “It is critical to elevate and address technical concerns which could impose additional risk to those who operate in high risk environments. You cannot remain silent if you have a technical concern – to do so may result in a devastating accident which has significant ramifications for your company or the nation.”

Watch a NASA HD video of the debris striking Columbia’s wing and of foam strike tests afterward.

—Patrick Kurp is a science writer in the George R. Brown School of Engineering.