Baker Institute panel members recall fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification

BY FRANZ BROTZEN
Rice News staff

“History presented us with a very, very narrow window of opportunity,” said former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III describing the events of Nov. 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down and the process of German unification began. “I think we took advantage of it, working together — all of us, and our governments and our leaders were able to shape events in ways that peacefully reunited Germany, that bolstered regional security at the time, that supported the ongoing economic and political integration of Europe and that contributed to a peaceful end to the Cold War.”

	JEFF FITLOW
	Rice historian Douglas Brinkley moderated a panel discussion at the Baker Institute Oct. 30 on the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification featuring former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, former German Federal Republic Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Charles Powell, who served as private secretary to former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and former German Democratic Republic Foreign Minister Markus Meckel. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze spoke to the audience via a satellite uplink from the Georgian capital, Tbilisi.

Baker was speaking to a full house at an Oct. 30 panel discussion at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy titled “German Unification: Expectations and Outcomes.” Baker was one of six senior statesmen in attendance who played leading roles in the events surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent negotiations that led to a unified Germany.

The other speakers at this historic event were former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, former German Federal Republic Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former German Democratic Republic Foreign Minister Markus Meckel and Charles Powell, who served as private secretary to former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze spoke to the audience via a satellite uplink from the Georgian capital, Tbilisi.

Genscher, who served as the West German foreign minister from 1974 to 1992, told the audience, “For me, Nov. 9, 1989, a dream came true.” Genscher explained that he was born in eastern Germany and left in 1952. The fall of the wall signified “a real freedom revolution,” he said. “We as Germans owe great gratitude to President [George H.W.] Bush and Secretary Baker for their unhesitating and strong and clear support for our unification.”

Powell credited the citizens who stood up against the possible threat that Soviet troops based in East Germany would crush the rebellion. “Western governments created the conditions in which it could happen,” he said, “but in the end of the day, it would not have happened without the individual decisions, the individual bravery, of the people who were prepared to go on the street and fight for what they knew they wanted.” Baker also spoke of “the indomitable spirit of the people of the German Democratic Republic,” who “took history into their own hands on Nov. 9, 1989.”

But perhaps the most praise was saved for former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Dumas, who served as French foreign minister from 1984 to 1986 and from 1988 to 1993, said, “Nothing would have been possible, things would not have happened, without the energy and the presence of Gorbachev. Gorbachev was the craftsman.” Similarly, after noting Soviet actions in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Baker praised the position of nonintervention adopted in 1989 by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, his foreign minister. “It was their very brave and courageous decision not to use force to keep the Soviet empire together that made all of this possible.”

Several panel participants returned to this issue of the Soviets’ acquiescence in the removal of travel restrictions on East German citizens, and by extension, the rest of the Warsaw Pact. Genscher recalled, “My conviction was that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze would not give the order to use force, that for them it was more important that a united Germany has the status which could not be a threat to the Soviet Union.”

TOMMY LAVERGNE
Powell, Dumas, Meckel, Genscher and Baker posed in front of a section of the Berlin Wall outside the Baker Institute.

For his part, Shevardnadze sought to put the decision into context, “I would like to clarify that the fall of the Berlin Wall should not be discussed as an event that happened all at once. This was a process that took a while to happen.” He cited the demonstrations, especially the large protests in Leipzig in October 1989 that preceded the breaching of the wall.

Baker recalled that Bush was attacked by some domestic critics for his stand in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the wall. “This was not a time for the United States to be triumphal,” Baker characterized Bush’s directive. “There wouldn’t be any dancing on the ruins of the wall.” Baker argued that Bush’s decision proved to be a wise one.

As the discussion moved from the events of Nov. 9 to subsequent developments, the panelists laid out some of the debates that led to German unification. Meckel, who became East German foreign minister in April 1990 and participated in those deliberations, remembered his mixed emotions when the wall fell. He was exhilarated at the prospect of democratic elections, but he favored a more gradual transition. Meckel hoped to see the establishment of a democratic government in the East first, which would be followed by a negotiated process of unification. However, the suddenness of the collapse of the Eastern bloc compressed the time frame. “The process of democratization and unification became one process from that day [Nov. 9],” Meckel said.

While the fall of the wall made the move toward unification “irresistible,” Baker said, the “ultimate shape and form of that unification, in both its domestic and international aspects, was far from clear and far from inevitable.” Issues ranging from Germany’s border with Poland to its membership in NATO had to be resolved, he said.

Both France and the United Kingdom had reservations about a united Germany. Powell described Thatcher’s reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall as “surprise, elation and caution.” She believed “this was a dangerous moment,” he said. While her attitude toward a united Germany reflected in part her generation’s experiences in two world wars, Thatcher was also concerned that “a rush to reunification” might threaten Gorbachev’s position in the Soviet Union, thus leading to greater instability and perhaps a return to a more hard-line Soviet leadership.

Nevertheless, Powell reminded the audience that whatever disagreements were expressed at the time, history will look favorably on the results. “In 1989 and 1990, we essentially achieved what we had wanted since 1945, which was a Europe that was peaceful and united with, at its heart, a Germany, which was peaceful and united.”

“Now perhaps we did not do a perfect job, ladies and gentlemen,” Baker told the audience, “but I hope my colleagues will agree with me that we did a damn good one.”

The panel was moderated by Rice history professor and Baker Institute presidential historian Douglas Brinkley. To watch the conference in its entirety, visit http://webcast.rice.edu/webcast.php?action=details&event=2057.